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Abstract 
The Canadian Free Trade Agreement 2017 (CFTA), which replaced the Agreement on Internal Trade 1995 
(AIT), provides a forum to resolve internal trade disputes against provinces, territories, and the federal 
government. Under its predecessor, the AIT, thirteen dispute panels and two appeal panels convened to 
adjudicate such claims; to date, no cases have yet been brought under the CFTA. Despite its lengthy 
lifespan and repeated use, little literature exists that critically examines the substantive findings and 
analytical methods found in the AIT’s jurisprudence (case law now inherited by the CFTA). Academic 
dialogue on the legal reasoning found within the body of rulings of Canada’s unique dispute forum can 
offer future CFTA adjudicators insights so as to improve the coherence, clarity, and consistency of their 
decisions. This article focuses, in particular, on the state of CFTA jurisprudence on the national treatment 
obligation, which is analogous to article III of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT). By investigating the trajectory of CFTA case law on the national treatment 
obligation, while interweaving insights from WTO jurisprudence, this article is able to identify the current 
state of doctrine, as well as continued shortcomings and uncertainties. In addition, this method of 
research can identify possible insights from WTO jurisprudence to fill analytical gaps. Especially in light of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s firm 2018 pronouncement in R v Comeau, which essentially shuttered 
court doors to domestic trade disputes, this research is of particular relevance as CFTA dispute panels 
going forward will only take on a heightened significance as a means to address internal barriers to trade. 
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OVER THE TWENTY-FIVE YEAR lifespan of the nation’s internal trade agreement 
regime, litigants have sought resolution to internal trade conficts from the 
profered adjudicatory process ffteen times.1 In each of these cases, ad hoc panels 
or appeal panels were convened to interpret and analyze the Agreement on Internal 
Trade 1995 (AIT) obligations in the context of the dispute at hand. Te reports 
issued by the dispute resolution bodies at the conclusion of the adjudicatory 
proceedings provide disputing parties the reasoning for the decisions. However, 
perhaps more consequentially, this collection of ffteen decisions issued by 
adjudicatory panels serves as the accumulated jurisprudence of the AIT (which 
was then inherited by the CFTA upon its replacement of the AIT in 2017). 
Tis set of case law provides meaningful guidance to Canadian governments and 
private parties as it clarifes the contours of the obligations providing for free 
trade within Canada. 
In the years since its creation, almost no secondary literature has been 
published that examines the reasoning and analysis found within the amassed 
CFTA jurisprudence. In seeking to initiate a scholarly dialogue on the content 
1. Canadian Free Trade Agreement–Consolidated Version, 24 April 2020, art 201(1), online 
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of internal trade dispute reports, this article explores in detail the trajectory of 
CFTA case law on one underpinning obligation in particular, found at article 
201(1) of the CFTA: national treatment.2 Tis article examines in detail seven 
key cases that have propelled the state of the CFTA’s national treatment doctrine 
to where it stands today. 
Before assessing the progression of panel and appellate panel interpretations 
of the national treatment obligation, this article will frst describe the origins of 
the CFTA and build the case for robust scholarly literature in this domain.3 
I. IMPETUS FOR AN INTERNAL TRADE AGREEMENT 
At section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the drafters of Canada’s foundational 
document included a provision that, read literally, should have created a nation 
where unfettered internal free trade prevailed. Te text of the section provides 
that “[a]ll Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the 
Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other 
provinces.”4 Tough the text of section 121 might have suggested that Canada 
would grow up to become a tightly integrated economic unit, by the time the 
CFTA came into existence in 1995, this had not become the case. In the 1980s, 
at a time when nations were liberalizing trade with one another, a number of 
scholars attempted to calculate the economic cost of internal barriers to trade. 
In 1983, John Whalley estimated that existing barriers to the fow of goods cost 
Canada one-half of one per cent of Canadian GNP each year (590 million CAD 
in today’s dollars).5 Later, in 1991, Todd Rutley estimated economy-wide efects 
on all trade fows, not just on those of goods, of 6.5 billion CAD per year.6 Te 
story of the CFTA’s origin stems from this disconnect between theorized national 
2. Ibid. 
3. Where the standalone word “agreement” is used in this article, it refers to the CFTA. 
References to the AIT will be made explicit. 
4. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 121. 
5. John Whalley, “Induced Distortions of Interprovincial Activity: An Overview of Issues” 
in Michael Trebilcock et al, eds, Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union (Ontario 
Economic Council, 1983) 161 at 190-92. 
6. Kathleen Macmillan & Patrick Grady, “Inter-Provincial Barriers to Internal Trade in Goods, 
Services and Flows of Capital: Policy, Knowledge Gaps and Research Issues” (2007) Industry 
Canada Working Paper No 2007-11, citing Todd Rutley, “‘Canada 1993’: A Plan for the 
Creation of a Single Economic Market in Canada,” (Canadian Manufacturers’ Association, 
1991) at 3, online (pdf ): <www.mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8709/1/MPRA_paper_8709. 
pdf> [perma.cc/HEN2-D4VE]. 








economic unity as manifested in the Constitution and the economic reality that 
empirical economics could quantify. 
Internal barriers to trade can largely be explained by the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s delicate navigation of the division of power between the federal 
government, the provinces, and the territories, in its narrow construction of 
section 121’s meaning. In narrowly interpreting its implication, the Court has 
sought to preserve the ability of provinces to regulate trade, even at the expense 
of national economic integration. Jurisprudence stemming as far back as Gold 
Seal Ltd v Dominion Express Co in 1921 severely circumscribes the power of 
section 121. Te most recent articulation of its narrow scope comes from the 
9–0 decision of R v Comeau which ruled that for a law to violate section 121, 
it must “in essence [restrict] trade across a provincial border.”7 A litigant may 
use section 121 to fght a tarif or its functional equivalent, but not much else. 
Without further guidance from the legislative branch of government, the Court 
is highly unlikely to deviate from its nearly one-hundred-year understanding 
of the provision. 
Tis state of afairs stands in marked contrast with that which has come 
to exist in the United States. Over the course of nearly two-hundred years, 
dating back to Gibbons v Ogden in 1824, the United States Supreme Court has 
cultivated and employed a doctrine known as the Dormant Commerce Clause 
(DCC).8 Sourcing to the US federal government’s authority over commerce in 
article I of the US Constitution, the DCC’s underlying principle is that state and 
local laws are unconstitutional should they unduly burden interstate commerce.9 
Even in the absence of US federal law, the US Court deploys the doctrine to deny 
protectionist rule making of the states. 
With the unavailability of an analogous judicial remedy to strike down those 
protectionist laws and regulations erected by Canadian governments that impede 
on the fow of goods, services, people, and investments, the Canadian polity 
came together and negotiated a political agreement that might serve almost 
the same purpose. 
7. Gold Seal Ltd v Alberta (AG) (1921), 62 SCR 424; R v Comeau, 2018 SCC 15 at para 8. 
8. Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). 
9. US Const, art I, § 8, cl 3. See generally Donald H Regan, “Te Supreme Court and 
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause” (1986) 84 
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II. THE CANADIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
As a result of the judicial impasse before the Court, as well as the failure of 
constitutional amendment at the Charlottetown Accords which may have 
otherwise strengthened constitutional free trade structures, the provinces, the 
territories, and the federal government came together in the spirit of cooperative 
federalism and crafted a political solution.10 Initially termed the Agreement on 
Internal Trade (AIT) at its genesis in 1995, but renamed the Canadian Free Trade 
Agreement at its re-negotiation in 2017, the CFTA imposes an additional set of 
internal trade rules on Canadian governments.11 Tese rules do not carry the force 
of law, nor do they displace constitutional obligations.12 Rather, they are simply 
a set of rules that each party to the agreement has agreed to comply with. Parties 
can exit the agreement with relative ease after providing the other parties twelve 
months’ notice, and the penalties for non-compliance—in practice—have been 
de minimis (though the text of the Agreement does technically allow for penalties 
of up to ten million dollars in certain circumstances).13 In a contemporary 
context, the CFTA obligations provide a norm for government actors to follow, 
rather than a binding rule. 
Owing to the era of rapid globalization in which it was conceived, the 
obligations found within the agreement fnd frm parallels with provisions in the 
CFTA’s international counterparts, such as the General Agreement on Tarifs and 
10. See Katherine Swinton, “Courting Our Way to Economic Integration: Judicial Review and 
the Canadian Economic Union” (1995) 25 Can Bus LJ 280 at 281, 288; Noemi Gal-Or, “In 
Search of Unity in Separateness: Interprovincial Trade, Territory, and Canadian Federalism” 
(1998) 9 NJCL 307 at 313. 
11. CFTA, supra note 1; Agreement on Internal Trade–Consolidated Version, 18 January 2000, 
online (pdf ): <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Consolidated-with-14th-
Protocol-fnal-draft.pdf> [perma.cc/6J7S-7H3F] [AIT]. Tis article acknowledges that the 
CFTA is a re-negotiated form of the AIT. However, as will be justifed later in the article, 
the content of the two agreements is substantially similar, and thus for ease of reference, 
this article uses the short form CFTA to refer to both the CFTA as well as the period 
when it was called the AIT. It specifes the AIT only where it is necessary to distinguish 
it from the CFTA. 
12. CFTA, supra note 1, art 1200. 
13. See CFTA, supra note 1, art 1214. See also ibid, Annex 1011.2, 1028.2. To date, the 
greatest monetary award made publicly available was for 31,191 CAD. See Report of 
the Article 1716 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between the Certifed General Accountants 
Association of New Brunswick and Québec Regarding Québec’s Measures Governing the Practice 
of Public Accounting (19 August 2005) at 24, online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat 
<www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/1_eng.pdf> 
[perma.cc/D9V4-UYUL]. 














Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1994 (NAFTA).14 
For example, article 201(2) of the CFTA serves as a national treatment provision 
for investments;15 a similar provision is found at article 1102 of the NAFTA.16 
Another instance of parallelism is in respect of the most favoured nation 
obligation imposed on the federal government at article 201(3) of the CFTA, and 
an analogous most favoured nation obligation found at article I of the GATT.17 
Not only does the CFTA impose trade obligations akin to those found between 
sovereign nations, but it also provides for a dispute settlement mechanism similar 
to those provided by bilateral and multilateral trade and investment agreements. 
Parties to the CFTA, and even private individuals, may initiate proceedings 
that ultimately lead to the creation of an ad hoc dispute panel to decide on a 
trade obstacle.18 Tis is similar to that which the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Dispute Settlement Body ofers for trade disputes under the GATT, 
or that which the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) framework provides to adjudicate an investment dispute under an 
applicable bilateral investment treaty.19 Te current version of the NAFTA also 
provides an arbitration process for investment disputes at chapter eleven, though 
this will change following the ratifcation and implementation of its successor 
agreement, the Canada–US–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).20 Under the CUSMA, 
the investor–state dispute settlement mechanism between the United States and 
14. General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 187 (1994) [GATT]; North American 
Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico and the 
Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 2 (entered into force 
1 January 1994) [NAFTA]. 
15. Article 201(2) of the CFTA is the successor to article 401(2)(a) of the AIT; CFTA, supra note 
1, art 201(2); AIT, supra note 11, art 401(2)(a). 
16. NAFTA, supra note 14, art 1102. 
17. CFTA Article 201(3) is the successor to AIT Article 401(1)(b). See CFTA, supra note 1, 
art 201(3); AIT, supra note 11, art 401(1)(b). A most favoured nation (MFN) obligation 
requires a party to accord no less favourable treatment to another party’s goods than the 
treatment it ofers a third party’s goods. 
18. CFTA, supra note 1, arts 1004, 1018. 
19. See Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [DSU]; 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID]) 575 UNTS 159. 
20. NAFTA, supra note 14, c 11. See also Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement 
(CUSMA), 30 November 2018, online: Government of Canada <www.international.gc.ca/ 
trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum> [perma.cc/ 
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Canada will discontinue three years after the termination of NAFTA.21 Disputes 
between Canada and Mexico will be governed by the mechanism found in the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacifc Partnership (CPTPP).22 
Notwithstanding this particular development in respect of NAFTA, at its core, 
the CFTA mimics the international trade and investment law framework and 
applies an analogous model to the domestic context of Canada. 
One novel feature of the CFTA regime that may herald a schism between the 
systems of internal trade and international trade arose when the CFTA replaced 
the AIT in 2017. Canadian governments included a regulatory cooperation and 
reconciliation process at chapter four of the CFTA. Tis mechanism emphasizes 
inter-governmental regulatory dialogue amongst Canadian governments to 
resolve divergent policies that impair trade.23 Tis process that the CFTA provides 
for also encourages the nationwide adoption of common measures.24 In contrast, 
the primary emphasis of international structures, such as the GATT, is the 
mutual recognition of divergent regulation.25 Over time, the CFTA reconciliation 
mechanism may serve as the primary means for trade barrier resolution, rather 
than recourse to litigation. Ultimately, this may erode the analogy between the 
CFTA and international trade dispute resolution mechanisms. 
A.  LACK OF SECONDARY LITERATURE EXAMINING CFTA 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In the course of the AIT’s lifetime26 there were ffteen occasions when complainants 
triggered the dispute resolution mechanism to convene a panel or appeal panel 
(together, “presiding body”) that then ultimately released a report. Tese reports 
provide a presiding body’s reasoning behind its decisions. CFTA reports are 
not binding on future cases (this was also true under the AIT). At article 1208, 
the CFTA provides that a presiding body “may take into account any relevant 
interpretations and fndings” contained in the report of a previous presiding 
21. Ibid, Annex 14-C. 
22. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacifc Partnership, 18 March 2018, ATS 
23 (entered into force 20 December 2018). 
23. CFTA, supra note 1, arts 400-408. 
24. Ibid. 
25. See generally Anabela Correia de Brito, Céline Kaufmann & Jacques Pelkmans, 
“Te Contribution of Mutual Recognition to International Regulatory 
Co-Operation” (2016) OECD Regulatory Policy Working Paper No 2, online: <doi. 
org/10.1787/5jm56fqsfxmx-en>. 
26. Tis period is inclusive of the time when the CFTA existed as its predecessor 
agreement, the AIT. 








body established under the AIT or the CFTA.27 At most, they may be seen as a 
persuasive authority. Nonetheless, later-in-time presiding bodies convened under 
the AIT routinely cited the reasoning and doctrine developed in previous AIT 
dispute reports for authority on an approach to a legal issue. Over the span of 
the ffteen reports issued by AIT presiding bodies, adjudicators have built upon 
and refned their interpretations of internal trade obligations in order to manage 
disputes over domestic trade barriers. Tis jurisprudence remains relevant for 
disputes under the CFTA. 
Despite repeated use of the internal trade regime’s dispute resolution 
mechanism, there exists little scholarly literature that critically assesses the 
jurisprudence, developing practices, and emergent doctrines that have inculcated 
thus far over the lifespan of the AIT/CFTA. Secondary scholarship plays an 
important role in refning the reasoning and methodology of any judicial system, 
and the lack of dialogue on CFTA adjudicatory outcomes hinders its efcacy and 
legitimacy. An uncertain state of CFTA jurisprudence can create two problems. 
First, it makes it difcult for government policy makers to craft CFTA-compliant 
measures. Second, it limits the ability of prospective litigants to assess their rights 
and entitlements under the CFTA in order to make an informed decision on 
whether to launch a CFTA complaint. 
Te focus of this article is on the national treatment obligation found 
at CFTA article 201(1).28 Tough this provision has experienced repeated 
interpretation by an overwhelming majority of dispute panels that have convened 
under the AIT, there exists no secondary literature that examines presiding body 
decisions on this issue in depth. Tis article explores the development of the 
jurisprudence on the CFTA’s national treatment provision, while interweaving 
insights from GATT case law on its analogous national treatment provision at 
article III. In doing so, this article will identify not only the state of the law, but 
also the sources of continued uncertainty. Drawing on WTO jurisprudence, this 
article ofers insights that may help fll analytical gaps. 
Te need for robust discussion about the reasoning found within the AIT 
panel and appeal panel reports is particularly strong in light of the fact that all 
CFTA presiding bodies (as did those under the AIT) convene on an ad hoc
basis. Tere is no standing adjudicatory body that helps build institutional 
knowledge; instead, in every case, complainant and respondent parties nominate 
one adjudicator each to serve on the presiding body, and these two nominated 
27. CFTA, supra note 1, art 1208 [emphasis added]. 
28. Te national treatment obligation under the AIT was at article 401, while its general 
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individuals decide between themselves on a third adjudicator.29 Tough one-third 
of AIT panelists have occupied over sixty per cent of all adjudicatory roles, 
very few have participated in the adjudication of more than two internal trade 
disputes.30 Tus, unlike in the domestic judicial context where judges who are 
appointed for lengthy tenures can build a knowledge-base and amass experience 
deciding disputes, most CFTA panelists will have never participated in a CFTA 
dispute, and are unlikely to participate in another.31 At the WTO, though panels 
are convened in a similar ad hoc fashion, there exists an Appellate Body that 
hears appeals from panel decisions, and whose members are elected for terms of 
up to eight years.32 
Te diferences between a standing and ad hoc adjudicatory body are 
meaningful, and they underscore the need for academic scholarship focused 
on CFTA jurisprudence. A potential frst-order distinction is in respect of 
impartiality, or perceived impartiality, as between panelists appointed by the 
parties to the dispute and panelists appointed by an external process for a fxed 
term. Evidence on this issue comes from the international context. Research by 
Albert Jan Van Den Berg suggests that arbitrators are infuenced by the party 
that appointed them.33 In the feld of investment arbitration, nearly all dissents 
have been written by the arbitrator appointed by the losing party.34 In the case 
of Canadian internal trade dispute adjudication, out of the ffteen published 
reports, only three of them saw dissenting opinions, though it is impossible to 
determine if they were written by the arbitrator appointed by the losing side. 
To help overcome actual or perceived bias, robust secondary literature must 
engage with the substantive reasoning found within the reports of presiding 
bodies and ofer its own critical assessment. 
Another important diference between these two forms of adjudicatory 
bodies that furthers the need for secondary literature is the relative diference 
in subject-matter fuency and procedural familiarity that members to a standing 
body gain relative to those members of an ad hoc adjudicatory body. With these 
29. CFTA, supra note 1, arts 1005, 1019. 
30. Ryan Manucha, “Arbitrator Bias and Domestic Trade Disputes” (18 February 2019), 
online: Canadian Lawyer <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/arbitrator-bias-and-
domestic-trade-disputes/275873> [perma.cc/3F77-XBEX] [Manucha, “Arbitrator Bias”]. 
31. Ibid. 
32. DSU, supra note 19, art 17. 
33. Albert Jan van den Berg, “Dissenting opinions by party-appointed arbitrators in investment 
arbitration,” in Mahnoush H Arsanjani et al, eds, Looking to the Future: Essays on 
International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhof, 2011) 821 at 824. 
34. Ibid. 












two relative strengths, standing bodies such as the WTO’s Appellate Body may 
be better able to create “workable jurisprudence” for interpreting legal texts.35 
Te set of interpretations that a fxed, institutionalized structure generates could 
arguably improve an ad hoc system’s coherence and predictability.36 However, 
given that the current CFTA model does not have an analogous standing appellate 
body, it is even more incumbent upon the academic community to cultivate legal 
academic literature that critically assesses the jurisprudence, so that future ad hoc
bodies may have some guidance as they conduct their adjudicatory duties. 
III. THE NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE 
Te fundamental objective of a national treatment provision is to prevent a party 
from treating foreign products less favorably than equivalent domestic products. 
Te existence of this type of non-discrimination clause dates back to at least 
as early as the twelfth or thirteenth century.37 Tere can be both explicit and 
implicit discrimination. An example of the former is a rule which says that, for 
example, all foreign-produced widgets may only be sold between midnight and 
fve o’clock in the morning, while domestically produced widgets may be sold 
at any point in the day. Initially at the WTO, breaches of national treatment 
obligations were found only in cases of explicit discrimination, otherwise known 
as de jure discrimination.38 However, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO 
has increasingly addressed a far more subtle violation of the national treatment 
principle—implicit discriminatory measures.39 
Implicit discrimination—otherwise known as de facto discrimination— 
comes from measures whose text does not necessarily suggest that foreign 
products are treated any less favourably than domestic “like” products, but in 
35. Anna Joubin-Bret, “Why We Need a Global Appellate Mechanism for International 
Investment Law” (27 April 2015), online (pdf ): Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment <www.ccsi.columbia.edu/fles/2013/10/No-146-Joubin-Bret-FINAL.pdf> 
[perma.cc/AC7R-EBTS]. 
36. See Karl P Sauvant, “Te International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Challenges 
and Options” (2015) at 11, online (pdf ): International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development and the World Economic Forum <e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ 
E15-Investment-Sauvant-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/6FRN-L2H6]. 
37. See Pieter VerLoren van Temaat, Te Changing Structure of International Economic Law
(Martinus Nijhof, 1981) at 16-21. 
38. Ion Gâlea & Bogdan Biriş, “National Treatment in International Trade and Investment Law” 
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practice, they are.40 For example, suppose Country X imposes a law that requires 
that the sale of beer with an alcohol-by-volume (ABV) in excess of 6 per cent 
be subject to a 100 per cent surcharge. However, Country X’s brewers solely 
produce beer with an ABV below 6 per cent; all beer with an ABV in excess of 
6 per cent comes from foreign producers. In this case, even though the measure 
does not explicitly distinguish the imported from the domestic goods, the efect 
of the measure is to treat imported beer less favourably than domestic beer. 
B. ARTICLE III OF THE GATT 
Before exploring the national treatment provision found within the CFTA, 
a cursory examination of the analogous provision in the GATT will help ground 
the discussion. It is worth noting that the GATT, and WTO jurisprudence in 
general, are authoritative sources in the context of the CFTA. Tere are three 
arguments in support of this proposition. First, CFTA article 1208(2)(b) 
explicitly allows CFTA presiding bodies to look to WTO law as a means to 
interpret provisions of the CFTA.41 Second, an emergent practice in CFTA case 
law is to draw on available insight from WTO law and jurisprudence to aid in 
the interpretation and analysis of CFTA obligations.42 Finally, as this article will 
demonstrate in the case of the national treatment provision, much of the language 
found within the CFTA is identical to that which is found in the GATT, 1994, 
and WTO jurisprudence in general. It is justifable for, if not incumbent upon, 
CFTA panelists to look to the well-developed body of law that has developed at 
the WTO over the course of its nearly four hundred published rulings. 
Tere may be instances where interpretations of the CFTA justifably 
depart from those of the GATT. Justifcation for this comes primarily from 
discernible intent in the text of the CFTA. Drafters of the CFTA made the 
explicit requirement that adjudicators sitting on frst-instance CFTA panels have 
40. John H Jackson, “National Treatment Obligations and Non-Tarif Barriers” (1989) 10 Mich 
J Intl L 207 at 213. 
41. CFTA, supra note 1, art 1208(2)(b). 
42. See e.g. Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta/British 
Columbia and Ontario Regarding Ontario’s Measures Governing Dairy Analogs and 
Dairy Blends (10 November 2004) at 18, online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www. 
cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/3_eng.pdf> [perma. 
cc/Y3VM-FKQ3] [Ontario–Dairy (I)]; Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the 
Dispute Between Alberta and Québec Regarding Québec’s Measure Governing the Sale 
in Québec of Coloured Margarine (23 June 2005) at 9-10, online (pdf ): Internal Trade 
Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/2_ 
eng.pdf> [perma.cc/TYF5-4BMP] [Québec–Margarine]. 
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“expertise or experience in matters covered by this Agreement.”43 As the CFTA 
is a domesticated version of an international trade agreement, the implication of 
this requirement is that panel members must have familiarity with international 
trade law. In contrast, CFTA appellate panel members must have “experience in 
Canadian administrative law or the resolution of disputes arising under Canadian 
administrative law.”44 Rather than install international trade law experts on the 
appellate panel, the CFTA opts for Canadian administrative law experts. To give 
meaning to this explicit distinction, it must be the case that drafters intended for 
tenets of Canadian administrative law to circumscribe or modify the application 
of international trade law in internal trade disputes. Drafters could easily have 
required international trade law expertise of appellate panel members. Tus, 
it may be proper for a CFTA presiding body to depart from GATT jurisprudence. 
Departure from extant GATT jurisprudence may also be necessary in light 
of contemporary political circumstances. At the time of this article’s publication, 
there is no standing Appellate Body at the WTO. As a result of political impasse, 
no new nominations for Appellate Body members have succeeded, and the 
Appellate Body cannot achieve quorum sufcient to preside over new cases. 
Tis existential crisis for the WTO’s Appellate Body may afect CFTA presiding 
bodies insofar as no new jurisprudential developments by the Appellate Body will 
be forthcoming until the impasse is resolved. 
Te GATT national treatment provision is at article III.45 It serves to 
prohibit laws that facilitate hidden protectionism, as well as those measures that 
are functionally equivalent to a tarif barrier.46 Within article III are two diferent 
streams of national treatment analysis—one for tax regulations at article III:2, 
and the other for non-tax measures at article III:4.47 Broadly speaking, both 
of these two streams undertake the same two-step analysis. First, the inquiry 
is to determine whether the imported and domestic goods are “like.” However, 
article III:2’s inquiry is broader than that of article III:4, as the former provision 
asks whether the two goods are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”48 
However, for both, the basic inquiry for the “like products” analysis is the same. 
43. CFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1005.2(3)(a). 
44. Ibid, Annex 1005.2(10)(a). 
45. GATT, supra note 14, art III. 
46. Peter M Gerhart & Michael S Baron, “Understanding National Treatment: Te Participatory 
Vision of the WTO” (2004) 14 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev 505 at 505-506. 
47. Ibid at 530. 
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It amounts to a determination as to whether the domestic and imported products 
are in a competitive relationship with one another.49 
Te second step in the GATT’s national treatment analysis is to determine 
whether less favorable treatment has been accorded to the imported good. Te 
adjudicator will seek to determine whether a WTO member has “modifed the 
conditions of competition in the market place to the detriment of imported 
products vis-à-vis like domestic products.”50 As discussed earlier, the discrimination 
can come in the form of an explicit or implicit measure implemented by a 
party to the GATT. 
Having explored the WTO framework for analyzing an alleged violation 
of the GATT national treatment provision, this article can more efectively 
understand the CFTA’s analogous provision, along with the trajectory of 
domestic jurisprudence. 
C. ARTICLE 201(1) OF THE CFTA 
Canada’s domestic trade agreement maintains a national treatment provision 
for goods at article 201(1). Embedded within the text of article 201(1) is a 
most favoured nation (MFN) obligation in addition to the national treatment 
obligation; however, a full analysis of the MFN component to 201(1) is outside 
the scope of this article. Terefore, it will only be discussed to the extent that it 
provides the basis of subsequent panel interpretation of the national treatment 
obligation. CFTA article 201 reads:51 
Non-Discrimination 
1. Each Party shall accord to goods of any other Party treatment no less favourable 
than the best treatment it accords to its own like, directly competitive or substitutable 
goods and to those of any other Party or non-Party. 
Te text of article 201(1) is equivalent, though not identical, to its predecessor 
found in the AIT at article 401(1). As can be seen below, the only diference is 
49. Border Tax Adjustments; Japan–Alcohol; Gerhart & Baron, supra note 46 at 530-31. 
50. Ming Du, “‘Treatment No Less Favorable’ and the Future of National Treatment Obligation 
in GATT Article III:4 after EC–Seal Products” (2016) 15 World Trade Rev 129 at 142 
(examining the Korea–Measures Afecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef Appellate 
Body report); WTO, Korea–Measures Afecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef
(2000), WTO Doc WT/DS161/AB/R at para 137 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm> [perma.cc/A37J-5X6G]. 
51. CFTA, supra note 1, art 201. 











that article 401(1) subdivides into the national treatment obligation at 401(1)(a) 
and the MFN obligation at 401(1)(b). AIT article 401 reads:52 
Reciprocal non-Discrimination 
1. Subject to Article 404, each Party shall accord to goods of any other Party 
treatment no less favourable than the best treatment it accords to: 
(a) its own like, directly competitive or substitutable goods; and 
(b) like, directly competitive or substitutable goods of any other Party or non-Party. 
As a result of the textual similarities, this article’s conclusions and analysis of 
dispute reports produced under the predecessor AIT in respect of article 401(1) 
(a) are applicable to article 201(1) of the CFTA. 
1. COMPARISON WITH THE TEXT OF GATT ARTICLE III 
A preliminary textual comparison between the CFTA and GATT shows that the 
national treatment provision of CFTA imports the standard of GATT article 
III:2, rather than article III:4, when comparing imported and domestic products 
under the frst part of the national treatment analysis. At 201(1), a party is not 
to accord less favourable treatment to the goods of another party that are “like, 
directly competitive or substitutable.”53 Tis standard of comparison is identical 
to that found at GATT article III:2. In contrast, as discussed above, article 
III:4 of the GATT merely asks if the products are “like” and does not include 
the “directly competitive or substitutable” language of article III:2. Te panel 
in Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages clarifed that “like products” are a subset
of “directly competitive and substitutable” products.54 As such, the article III:2 
“like, directly competitive or substitutable” assessment is broader than the article 
III:4 “likeness” assessment. 
Given that CFTA article 201(1) imports the language of GATT article III:2, 
CFTA panels may more appropriately fnd WTO authority for the imported 
versus domestic product comparison pursuant to a national treatment analysis in 
the WTO’s jurisprudence for article III:2 rather than article III:4. However, this 
is a peculiar result. Article III:2 of the GATT is the national treatment obligation 
for measures that are internal taxes or charges, while article III:4 is directed 
towards measures that are non-tax regulations. Given that article 802 of the 
52. AIT, supra note 11, art 401. 
53. CFTA, supra note 1, art 201. 
54. Korea–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (1999), WTO Doc WT/DS75/AB/R at para 118 
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CFTA essentially excludes any measure relating to taxation from falling within 
the scope of the agreement, a CFTA panel will never address a national treatment 
complaint against a taxation measure.55 Tus, drafters of the CFTA (and the AIT) 
opted for the more expansive “like, directly competitive or substitutable” standard 
of GATT article III:2, whose jurisprudence is not relevant to any potential CFTA 
national treatment case, and eschewed the narrower “like” standard of article 
III:4 along with its more relevant jurisprudence. 
D. THE TRAJECTORY OF CFTA JURISPRUDENCE ON THE NATIONAL 
TREATMENT PROVISION 
Te internal trade regime’s national treatment obligation was invoked by 
complainants and interpreted by dispute panels on a number of occasions 
throughout the AIT’s existence. Tese rulings now inform the identical obligation 
found in the CFTA. Tis article will now examine these interpretations and 
establish the state of national treatment jurisprudence under the CFTA. However, 
in order to understand the trajectory of the national treatment case law, this 
article must frst start by examining the interpretation of the AIT/CFTA’s MFN 
obligation in Canada—MMT.56 
1. CANADA–MMT 
Tough the panel in Canada–MMT introduced the test for a violation of the 
federal government’s MFN obligation under the AIT (and now, the CFTA), 
later-in-time AIT dispute panels referred to and imported substantially the same 
MFN test crafted in Canada–MMT to interpret the AIT’s national treatment 
obligation. As such, though there are important diferences between the principles 
of MFN and national treatment, the assessment of the CFTA’s national treatment 
jurisprudence necessarily starts here. 
In this case, the Alberta government submitted that the federal government’s 
new law prohibiting the import and interprovincial trade of manganese 
tricarbonyl (MMT)—a common additive to gasoline used to increase octane 
levels—violated the federal government’s MFN obligation found at article 
55. CFTA, supra note 1, art 802. Te AIT had an almost identical provision at article 1805. See
AIT, supra note 11, art 1805. 
56. Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Alberta and Canada Regarding 
the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act (12 June 1998), online (pdf ): Internal Trade 
Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/8_ 
eng.pdf> [perma.cc/AX6G-K9YG] [Canada–MMT]. 
















401(3).57 Tis provision of the AIT (which persists in the CFTA) states that the 
federal government must accord goods of a province or territory treatment “no 
less favourable than the best treatment it accords like, directly competitive or 
substitutable goods” of any other province.58 
Te panel examined AIT article 401(3) and interpreted it to call for a two-part 
test.59 First, the presiding body is to inquire whether there existed discrimination 
against the goods of another party.60 Tis discrimination could come as either 
“direct” or “indirect” discrimination.61 Direct discrimination is “where goods 
from one Party are favoured over identical goods from another Party.”62 Indirect 
discrimination is where “goods produced predominantly in the territory of one 
Party are favoured over directly competitive or substitutable goods produced 
predominantly in the territory of another Party.”63 Second, after establishing one 
of the two forms of discrimination, the panel is to determine whether the goods 
are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”64 
In construing the analysis in this fashion, the AIT panel adopted an approach 
that is the reverse of that which is set forth in WTO MFN case law. In the WTO 
jurisprudence for the GATT MFN provision provided at article I, in practice it 
is only after establishing likeness between the goods of a complainant and a third 
party that a WTO panel will determine if a nation accorded better treatment to 
the goods of a third party than that extended to the goods of the complaining 
party.65 Te WTO’s MFN analysis is more complex than what has been described 
57. Ibid at 1-2. 
58. AIT, supra note 11, art 401(3). Tis was the predecessor to article 201(3) of the CFTA. See 
CFTA, supra note 1, art 201(3). 
59. Canada–MMT, supra note 56 at 6-7. 





65. European Communities–Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products
(2014), WTO Doc WT/DS400/AB/R at para 5.99 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm> [perma.cc/779M-5VSU]. 
In WTO jurisprudence, just as is the case for national treatment allegation analysis, 
panels and the Appellate Body always examine “likeness” in the MFN analysis before 
determining whether the impugned measure constituted discrimination in violation of 
the MFN obligation. GATT MFN discrimination in the sense of article I:1 cannot arise 
if the products are not “like,” functionally making it a precondition—as such, a fnding of 
likeness precedes any MFN discrimination analysis. See Canada–Certain Measures Afecting 
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here, but any further expansion is outside the scope of this article which is focused 
on the interpretation of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment provision. 
Setting aside the panel’s inverted formulation of the MFN test found within 
WTO case law, there were a number of weaknesses in the way that the Canada– 
MMT panel formulated the MFN test, all of which had direct implications on 
subsequent panels’ interpretation of the CFTA’s national treatment obligation. 
Te frst has to do with its defnition of “direct discrimination.” Te panel 
provided that, in order to constitute direct discrimination, the imported and 
domestic goods needed to be “identical.”66 However, this standard of “identical” 
does not have any basis in the text of AIT article 401(1)(a) (or its successor, 
CFTA article 201(1)). Not only does the standard of “identical” lack textual 
authority, but it creates internal incoherence with the second step of the test 
outlined by the Canada–MMT presiding body: Tat the goods need to be “like, 
directly competitive or substitutable.”67 Is “identical” the same as “like, directly 
competitive or substitutable”? Te Canada–MMT panel left the standard of 
comparison uncertain in a direct discrimination analysis. 
Te second fundamental problem with the Canada–MMT panel’s 
formulation of the test was that an inverted version of the WTO’s MFN analysis 
inherently renders the second part of the test superfuous. Te defnitions of 
“direct” and “indirect” discrimination at the frst stage of the national treatment 
analysis, according to the Canada–MMT report, explicitly require a panel to 
undertake a comparison of the imported and domestic products. In the case of 
direct discrimination, the products must be “identical” in the frst stage of the 
analysis; for an instance of indirect discrimination, the products must be “directly 
competitive or substitutable” at the frst stage.68 Te second stage of the MFN 
analysis, according to the Canada–MMT report, then requires a fnding that the 
imported and domestic product are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”69 
Ignoring the fact that the Canada–MMT panel uses diferent language to describe 
the standards of comparison for the frst and second stage of both an indirect or 
direct discrimination assessment, the second stage becomes irrelevant given that 
the comparison already took place in the frst stage. 
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds139_e.htm> 
[perma.cc/R6JZ-S5J9]. 















Te fnal shortcoming to the Canada–MMT MFN analysis is in the 
implementation of its own test that it had created earlier in the same panel 
report. Te Canada–MMT panel did not fnd discrimination in the frst stage 
of its analysis, so it ruled that it was not required to proceed to the second step 
of the MFN analysis and make a determination as to whether MMT-infused 
gasoline was “like, directly competitive or substitutable” to MMT-free gasoline.70 
Regardless of whether there was discrimination, the panel’s own formulation of 
the frst stage of the test, provided at page seven, necessarily required the panel 
to have already examined the likeness of the imported and domestic products 
to make a frst-stage conclusion.71 Had the panel properly undertaken its own 
frst-stage analysis, it should have already had to come to a conclusion as to the 
likeness of the products. Tus, the panel either incorrectly applied its own test, 
or was disingenuous in refusing to provide its conclusion as to the likeness of 
MMT-free and MMT-infused gasoline. 
Tough the panel report in Canada–MMT was a landmark issuance as the 
frst report produced under the then-new AIT, the strength of its MFN test 
was lacking. As will be observed in subsequent cases, because later adjudicatory 
panels nearly replicated the MFN test from Canada–MMT for the AIT/CFTA’s 
national treatment test, the analytical faults permeated successive fndings of 
national treatment obligation violations. 
2. PEI–DAIRY 
PEI–Dairy,72 the second panel convened under the AIT, converted the Canada– 
MMT panel’s MFN test into a national treatment test. In the text of the opinion, 
the panel explicitly noted that it was adopting the “same criteria” for its national 
treatment analysis as that which had been used in Canada–MMT’s MFN analysis, 
but the panel does not justify why this is appropriate.73 Moreover, by importing the 
test from Canada–MMT, the panel imported those same analytical shortcomings 
identifed in Part III(C)(1), above, such as the inconsistent likeness standards 
and the redundant second-step in a two-part analysis. In addition, as Part III(C) 
70. Ibid. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Nova Scotia and Prince 
Edward Island Regarding Amendments to the Dairy Industry Act Regulations (18 Jan 
2000), online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/ 
DisputeResolution/PanelReports/7_eng.pdf> [perma.cc/4CQN-8AXQ] [PEI–Dairy]. 
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(2) will describe below, the panel decision in PEI–Dairy generated its own set 
of uncertainties. 
Te panel in PEI–Dairy was convened to address the complaint by Nova 
Scotia that Prince Edward Island had indirectly discriminated against Nova Scotia 
fuid milk.74 In 1997, PEI had revoked all existing licenses for dairy processors 
and distributors, and required producers to reapply.75 A Nova Scotia company, 
which previously held a licence, was denied a new one upon reapplication.76 
As part of its complaint, the Nova Scotia company claimed that “like, directly 
competitive or substitutable” Nova Scotia fuid milk was subjected to worse 
treatment than that of PEI.77 
In its analysis, the panel employed the MFN test from Canada–MMT to the 
case of PEI’s alleged national treatment obligation violation.78 Tus, the panel in 
PEI–Dairy seemingly collapsed the national treatment and MFN tests under the 
AIT into a single test, and the panel did not even announce that it had done so. 
Te panel even suggests that the MFN test from Canada– MMT is the applicable 
test for all claims under the AIT article 401 (non-discrimination) but neglects 
to discuss the fact that the non-discrimination clause subdivides into an MFN 
and a national treatment provision.79 As a result, the panel in PEI–Dairy merged 
two fundamentally unique concepts in the domain of trade law, and no presiding 
body has, as of yet, clarifed or distinguished this decision. 
In addition to generating confusion within CFTA jurisprudence by 
collapsing the national treatment and MFN concepts, the panel generated 
further uncertainty as the national treatment test it employed was an inverted 
formulation of its GATT counterpart, just as was the MFN test established by 
the panel in Canada–MMT. Whereas the GATT’s national treatment test under 
article III:4 frst asks whether the goods are “like”—or in the case of article III:2, 
whether the goods are “like, directly competitive or substitutable”—according 
to this AIT panel’s formulation of the test, the “like, directly competitive or 
substitutable” analysis commences only after a panel establishes discrimination.80 
Tis inversion made it difcult for domestic trade dispute panels to accurately 
employ WTO jurisprudence to support their analysis of a claim under the AIT. 
It was not until the most recent presiding body report, issued pursuant to the 
74. Ibid at 1-2. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid. 
77. Ibid at 2. 
78. Ibid at 8-9. 
79. Ibid at 8. 
80. Ibid at 8-9. 











appeal case of Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel), that a dispute panel fipped 
the order of the AIT/CFTA’s traditional national treatment test so that it aligned 
with the WTO’s national treatment test.81 
One additional issue in respect of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment 
obligation was raised but left uncertain by the panel in PEI–Dairy. Te panel
provided that a claim of indirect discrimination must show a “geographical 
component to the discrimination for a measure to be inconsistent” with a 
government’s national treatment obligation.82 Te notion of a “geographical 
component” was frst mentioned in Canada–MMT but the panel in that case 
did not signifcantly develop the concept.83 Tere is no textual authority in 
the AIT nor the CFTA that the measure of a province or territory must have a 
“geographical component” for it to constitute indirect discrimination. Tough 
the panel in PEI–Dairy discusses the concept at greater length than the panel 
in Canada–MMT, it does not clarify the nature or substance of the term 
“geographical component.” In PEI–Dairy, the panel did not have to discuss the 
term “geographical component” as PEI admitted to the panel that “geography 
was the fundamental factor” in their withdrawal of certain Nova Scotia dairy 
licenses.84 Moreover, the panel wrote that the “geographical component” was 
satisfed as a result of the evidence demonstrating that “the only fuid milk imports 
allowed were products that did not compete with PEI-produced products.”85 Left 
uncertain, however, is both the nature of the “geographical component” as well as 
the means to identify it. Te next case, New Brunswick–Dairy, attempts to clarify 
the concept but creates other ambiguities in doing so.86 
81. Appeal of the Report of the Panel in the Dispute Between Artisan Ales Consulting Inc. and the 
Government of Alberta Regarding Mark-Ups on Beer (11 May 2018) at 15, online (pdf ): 
Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/GOA-vs.-Artisan-
Ale-appeal-report-Final.pdf> [perma.cc/R29W-GNPY] [Alberta–Beer Mark Ups 
(Appeal Panel)]. 
82. PEI–Dairy, supra note 72 at 8. 
83. See Canada–MMT, supra note 56 at 7. 
84. PEI–Dairy, supra note 72 at 9. 
85. Ibid. 
86. Report of the Article 1716 Panel Concerning the Dispute Between Farmers Co-operative Dairy 
Limited of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Regarding New Brunswick’s Fluid Milk Distribution 
Licensing Measures (13 September 2002), online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www. 
cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/DisputeResolution/PanelReports/5_eng.pdf> [perma. 












   
MANUCHA, INTERNALIzING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 447 
3. NEW BRUNSWICK–DAIRY 
Te panel report for New Brunswick–Dairy expanded CFTA jurisprudence on 
the concept of the “geographical component” to include a claim of indirect 
discrimination in the context of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation. 
At issue was a New Brunswick law (the Natural Products Act), neutral on its face, 
which stated that the New Brunswick Farm Products Commission (NBFPC) 
was not allowed to issue a licence for fuid milk distribution unless doing so was 
“in the interest of general public or dairy products trade.”87 In New Brunswick– 
Dairy, the NBFPC rejected a Nova Scotia dairy producer’s fuid milk licence 
application.88 However, the panel ultimately held that in light of the “context 
of the purpose” of the New Brunswick legislation, it did not believe that the 
Act would be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.89 Specifcally, the panel 
held that it was “extremely difcult for the Act to be applied in a manner that 
is geographically neutral.”90 Te panel in New Brunswick–Dairy thus advanced 
AIT (and thus CFTA) jurisprudence on indirect discrimination by clarifying 
that the “geographic component” discussed in PEI–Dairy is a standard of 
geographic neutrality. 
Tough the panel creates the standard of “geographically neutral” to assess a 
claim of indirect discrimination under the national treatment obligation, it leaves 
the standard’s meaning ambiguous and uncertain. Does it mean that 50 per cent 
of all licences should be given to provincial dairy producers, and the other 50 per 
cent to out-of-province dairy producers? Or perhaps that licences are distributed 
on a basis of the percentage of dairy producers headquartered in New Brunswick 
relative to the rest of the country? Te panel in New Brunswick–Dairy improves 
the analytical approach to an indirect discrimination claim, but it leaves the 
contours of the new “geographically neutral” standard undefned. 
4. ONTARIO–DAIRY (I) 
Te sixth panel report issued under the AIT, Ontario–Dairy (I), was the frst to 
explicitly draw the links between the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation 
and that of the WTO.91 Te panel provided that AIT article 401 “provides a 
broad non-discrimination obligation akin to the national treatment obligation 
87. Ibid at 1. 
88. Ibid. 
89. New Brunswick–Dairy, supra note 86 at 13. 
90. Ibid [emphasis added]. 
91. See Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42. 













contained in a variety of international trade agreements such as the [WTO] 
agreements.”92 Tough panels had long imported the language and concepts 
from the domain of international trade law, this was the frst time that a panel 
explicitly drew the link in the text of an opinion. 
Tough the panel in Ontario–Dairy (I) explicitly links the AIT/CFTA’s 
national treatment provision to its counterpart found inside of the GATT, 
it proceeds to evaluate it on the basis of a standard that is not found within 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body jurisprudence under the GATT. Te panel 
wrote that the impugned Ontario legislation “fail[ed] to provide to the producers 
of these products from other provinces the best treatment it accords to producers 
of dairy products in Ontario.”93 In GATT article III jurisprudence, the national 
treatment obligation does not mandate that parties provide the “best treatment” 
to that of other producers. Contrastingly, the standard of “best treatment” found 
in both the text of the AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation, as well as 
attendant jurisprudence, is a frm deviation from the explicit language of the 
GATT article III which requires treatment that is “no less favourable.”94 CFTA 
jurisprudence has yet to clarify if and how this diference in language between the 
two national treatment obligations is meaningful. 
A shortcoming in the panel’s analysis of the complainant’s national treatment 
claim is in respect of its “like, directly competitive or substitutable” analysis. 
Te faults in Ontario–Dairy (I)’s analysis on this particular issue pervades CFTA 
national treatment jurisprudence and warrants greater attention by future 
panels. At issue in the case were Ontario’s restrictions on the trade of dairy 
analogs and dairy blends.95 Dairy analogs are imitation dairy products that are 
actually vegetable based, while dairy blends are vegetable oil products that are 
combined with any amount and any kind of milk ingredient to create a good that 
resembles a dairy product.96 Te complainants in this case—Alberta and British 
Columbia—alleged that Ontario measures discriminated against their “like, 
directly competitive or substitutable” dairy analogs and dairy blend products and 
gave better treatment to pure Ontario dairy products.97 In a defcient analysis, the 
panel summarily concludes that the two sets of goods are “like.”98 At no point in 
the opinion does the panel undertake any form of analysis or interpretation of the 
92. Ibid at 18. 
93. Ibid. 
94. See GATT, supra note 14 at art III. 
95. Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42 at 1. 
96. Ibid at 1. 
97. Ibid at 1-5. 
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phrase “like, directly competitive or substitutable” to determine whether or not 
dairy analogs or blends were indeed sufciently similar to pure dairy products. 
Tis difers substantially from WTO jurisprudence wherein the Appellate 
Body has identifed a set of four factors that a panel must examine in order to 
determine likeness.99 In a WTO likeness assessment, a panel must consider each 
of the four following factors: (1) Physical characteristics, (2) Consumer tastes and 
habits, (3) End uses, and (4) Tarif classifcation.100 Te WTO’s Appellate Body 
has even ruled that a panel must examine the evidence relating to each of those 
four criteria.101 
Arguably, the respondent, Ontario, was deprived of informed reasoning 
when the panel report that was issued did not contain a meaningful “likeness” 
analysis. Not only does the panel provide scant justifcation in the instant case, 
but it also leaves uncertain the requisite analysis for a conclusion of “likeness” 
in a CFTA national treatment analysis. Without a factor-based test, the concern 
arises that a determination of “likeness” will be the product of a panel’s subjective 
intuition, rather than a fact-based analysis. Tis case was the frst instance in 
which an AIT panel encountered two products that were sufciently diferent to 
warrant a more searching analysis than had been conducted in the past. 
5. QUÉBEC–MARGARINE 
Te panel in Québec–Margarine commits the same fault as the panel in Ontario– 
Dairy (I) in undertaking an inadequate “likeness” analysis when conducting its 
national treatment assessment.102 Moreover, some of the writing in the report 
suggests that the panelists may have misread WTO case law. However, the panel 
improved the AIT/CFTA jurisprudence on the identifcation of the “comparator” 
class of goods in its national treatment test. 
At issue in Québec–Margarine was a Quebec measure that required 
out-of-province margarine producers to colour their product white, which 
efectively made the margarine look similar to lard and less appetizing to the 
99. European Communities–Measures Afecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos 
(Complaint by Canada) (2001), WTO Doc WT/DS135/AB/R at para 101 (Appellate Body 
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds135_e.htm> 
[perma.cc/WXS8-UZ5C] [EC–Asbestos]. 
100. Ibid. 
101. Ibid at para 109 [emphasis in original]. 
102. See Québec–Margarine, supra note 42. 
















consumer than butter.103 It was argued that the measure was implemented to 
protect the Quebec dairy industry and its sales of butter.104 
Te panel provides an inadequate likeness analysis, just as the Ontario–Dairy 
(I) panel had done. Te panel ofers little justifcation for its determination that 
butter and margarine are “like, directly competitive or substitutable” to one 
another. Te only rationale for a fnding of “likeness” provided in the opinion is 
that because the impugned Quebec regulation repeatedly treats margarine as a 
substitute for butter, it is thus in a “like” relationship with butter.105 None of the 
four WTO factors are cited or used by the panel in its determination. It leaves a 
reader, or respondent, unsatisfed as to the reasons provided for the conclusion 
that the two products exist within a “like, directly competitive or substitutable” 
relationship with one another. It does not meaningfully advance the case law or 
the test for use by future panels, and it does not ofer much guidance to potential 
future litigants. 
In addition to the shortcomings of its likeness analysis, the panel also 
misinterprets WTO case law on the GATT national treatment obligation (article 
III). Te panel spends part of the report attempting to discern the proper test of 
comparison as between the imported and domestic product. It provided that “[i]n
contrast to the formulation of GATT Article III, which deals with the treatment 
accorded to imported products in comparison to ‘like domestic products,’” the 
AIT predecessor to CFTA article 201(1) maintained that “the class of comparators 
includes not only like goods but ‘directly competitive or substitutable goods.’”106 
While the panel accurately writes that the CFTA test asks not merely whether the 
products are “like” but also whether the two products are “directly competitive or 
substitutable,” it incorrectly claims that the GATT article III test only employs 
a “like” products test. As described in Part III(B), above, the GATT article III:4 
national treatment provision indeed only asks the panel to determine whether the 
imported and domestic product stand in a “like” relationship with one another.107 
However, the GATT article III:2 national treatment provision imposes the exact 
same test as the AIT/CFTA: Do the domestic and imported products exist in 
either a “like” or “directly competitive or substitutable” relationship with one 
another.108 It is true that GATT article III:2 applies to taxation measures and 
103. Ibid at 3. 
104. Ibid at 4. 
105. Ibid at 25. 
106. Ibid at 24. 
107. GATT, supra note 14, art III:4, Annex I at para 2. 
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GATT article III:4 applies to non-taxation measures. Nonetheless, the “like, 
directly competitive or substitutable” analysis of the products themselves can still 
inform a CFTA national treatment analysis. Te panel’s unfortunate proclamation 
on WTO case law obscures the fact that GATT article III, in part, does maintain 
an identical test to that of the (former) AIT article 401(1).109 Québec–Margarine 
erroneously suggests that a panel or complainant may not validly look to GATT 
article III:2 case law to help determine whether two products are “like, directly 
competitive or substitutable” in the course of a CFTA dispute.110 
Despite the report’s analytical shortcomings, the panel does accurately 
identify that the product comparison is not just whether the two products are 
“like.” Rather, the drafters provided for a more expansive standard of comparison 
in the national treatment analysis by providing the standard of “like, directly 
competitive or substitutable.” Tough it remains unclear why AIT drafters and 
CFTA re-negotiators opted for a broader version of the product comparison test, 
the panel in this case clarifes for future panels that the nature of the language 
meaningfully impacts the “like products” analysis in a national treatment claim. 
6. QUÉBEC–DAIRY 
Te panel report in Québec–Dairy111 resurfaces the uncertainty caused by the 
notion of “geographically neutral” measures in a national treatment analysis 
that had frst been generated by PEI–Dairy and New Brunswick–Dairy. 
At issue in Québec–Dairy was a facially-neutral measure that restricted the sale 
of vegetable-based dairy alternatives as well as dairy blends.112 Te literal text of 
the impugned Quebec measure did not suggest that imported products would 
incur discriminatory treatment relative to domestic products.113 However, the 
complainants claimed that the operation of the measure nonetheless discriminated 
against imported products—namely dairy blends and dairy alternatives.114 Tus, 
this was a case of alleged “indirect” discrimination. However, the panel’s analysis 
109. See CFTA, supra note 11, art 201(1). 
110. Québec–Margarine, supra note 42. 
111. Report of Article 1703 Panel Regarding the Dispute between Saskatchewan and Québec 
Concerning Dairy Blends, Dairy Analogues and Dairy Alternatives (21 March 2014), 
online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat <www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/pdfs/English/ 
DisputeResolution/PanelReports/PANEL%20REPORT%20-FINAL%20VERSION.pdf> 
[perma.cc/WT73-RS7R] [Québec–Dairy]. 
112. Ibid at 4. 
113. Ibid at 4-6. 
114. Ibid at 6. 














as to whether the measure produced indirect discrimination in violation of the 
AIT/CFTA’s national treatment obligation was severely lacking. 
In its reasoning as to whether the Quebec measure indirectly discriminated 
against imported “like, directly competitive or substitutable” products, the panel 
in Québec–Dairy stated that it was “mindful” of the fndings in New Brunswick– 
Dairy, wherein that earlier panel provided that there must be a “geographical 
component” to a case of indirect discrimination.115 Notably, the panel in Québec– 
Dairy did not explicitly note the new standard of “geographical neutrality” that 
New Brunswick–Dairy had created. 
In its fnding that the measure violated Quebec’s national treatment obligation 
under the AIT, the panel failed to interpret the AIT in light of the facts of the 
case at hand. Te panel report does not explain how the measure discriminates 
against imported goods. Te panel merely provided that the prohibition of dairy 
alternatives and dairy blends “discriminates in favour of [Quebec’s] domestic dairy 
producers and processors.”116 It provided, at best, a circular argument rather than 
substantive reasoning. If the complainant, Saskatchewan, and the respondent, 
Quebec, both have producers of dairy products, as well as dairy blends and 
alternatives, then how can the Quebec measure be said to unfairly discriminate 
against imported products, when the measure necessarily discriminates against 
domestic Quebec products as well? Te report does not provide enough 
information for a reader to draw the conclusion that the panel did. 
7. ALBERTA–BEER MARK-UPS (APPEAL PANEL) 
Te ffteenth and most recent dispute report issued under the AIT—the appeal 
panel report from Artisan Ales’ complaint against Alberta’s beer measures— 
substantially improves the case law on the national treatment obligation 
under the CFTA. 
One of its most important contributions to the CFTA case law is the appeal 
panel’s criticism of the adequacy of the written reasons in the lower panel’s 
decision. It disapproved of the lower panel’s report for “its fndings that were 
perfunctory at best.”117 Te appeal panel wrote that “[t]he majority did not 
interpret or analyze the Articles of the AIT that it found in its conclusions were 
violated” by Alberta’s measures.118 Looking back to the lower panel’s report, this 
is indeed the case. Firstly, the majority’s writing in the lower panel’s report was 
115. Ibid at 16. 
116. Ibid at 17. 
117. See Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel), supra note 81 at para 63. 
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a mere ten pages, while the preponderance of dispute panel reports have thus 
far registered at nearly thirty pages. In respect of the alleged national treatment 
violation, the full extent of the lower panel’s assessment was that the cited measures 
were “inconsistent” with AIT article 401.119 Absolutely no reasoning is given for 
the national treatment violation.120 Tough the panel report on this matter was 
particularly lacking in its written fndings relative to the reports of all prior panels 
up to that point, the appeal panel frmly pronounced the initial panel failed 
to interpret or analyze the AIT articles. Tis analysis for CFTA articles moving 
forward should help to improve the nature of the fndings of all panels. As this 
article has thus far discussed, there have been many instances where panel reports 
fail to expand on the reasons for their conclusions. 
Another important contribution of this case to CFTA jurisprudence is 
its reversal of the order of the national treatment test found in prior CFTA 
jurisprudence. A determination of whether the measure discriminates against 
imported products now comes after the test of whether the imported and domestic 
products are “like, directly competitive or substitutable.”121 Tis re-formulation 
is now consistent with the national treatment test found in WTO jurisprudence 
of GATT article III. By correcting the order, Alberta–Beer Mark-Ups (Appeal 
Panel) has given greater legitimacy and authority to WTO national treatment 
jurisprudence as it relates to the CFTA national treatment obligation. 
In addition to re-ordering the CFTA national treatment test to align with 
WTO national treatment case law, the adjudicators in Alberta–Beer Mark Ups 
(Appeal Panel) also tethers the CFTA’s “no less favorable treatment” analysis 
to GATT article III jurisprudence. In the body of its report, the appeal panel 
provided for a fundamental underlying principle to the CFTA’s national treatment 
obligation that is identical to that which is found in WTO national treatment 
case law. In doing so, the appeal panel implicitly encourages CFTA panels to 
consider the robust body of law on GATT article III. Te appeal panel stated 
that an impugned Alberta measure provided less favorable treatment to imported 
products as it “does not provide equality of competitive opportunities” as between 
Alberta and out-of-province beer.122 Tis concept of “equality of competitive 
conditions” as the core inquiry guiding a national treatment analysis is a bedrock 
119. Report of Article 1716 Panel Regarding the Dispute between Artisan Ales Consulting Inc. and 
Alberta regarding Beer Markups (28 July 2017) at 10, online (pdf ): Internal Trade Secretariat 
<www.cfta-alec.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Decision-July-28-2017-Signed.pdf> 
[perma.cc/8RUR-5GXR] [Alberta–Beer Mark Ups]. 
120. Ibid at 10. 
121. Ibid at para 82. 
122. Ibid at para 88. 
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of WTO national treatment analysis under GATT article III.123 By linking the 
essential exercise of a CFTA panel and the WTO panel in assessing a claim of 
national treatment, future CFTA panels may more authoritatively draw upon 
reasoning and conclusions from the domain of WTO jurisprudence. 
Finally, the Alberta–Beer Mark Ups (Appeal Panel) report provided the most 
comprehensive analysis of a national treatment allegation to date. Te report clearly 
demonstrated the connection between the measure at issue and the discrimination 
that it produces so as to violate the CFTA’s national treatment obligation. For 
the frst time, an AIT report does not leave a reader to make logical inferences 
in order to arrive at the report’s conclusion. Te report carefully explains to the 
reader the causal connection between Alberta’s provision of monetary grants 
to domestic Albertan microbrewers and the consequential discrimination that 
out-of-province microbrewers experienced in the Alberta marketplace.124 If taken 
as a template, this appeal panel report will elevate the reasoning and clarity of 
future CFTA reports in respect of the national treatment obligation. 
E. CONTINUED UNCERTAINTIES IN CFTA DOCTRINE AND POTENTIAL 
SOLUTIONS 
Part III(C), above, explored the trajectory of CFTA jurisprudence concerning the 
national treatment obligation, now found at CFTA article 201(1). Due respect 
must be accorded to the work of the panellists—these individuals were tasked 
with the job of identifying, interpreting, and implementing a foreign set of rules 
and principles in a novel dispute forum. To date, Canada is the only country that 
has created a trade agreement and dispute settlement body for domestic parties 
to litigate internal trade barriers. 
Tis investigation has identifed a number of shortcomings and uncertainties 
generated by some of the fndings in these panel reports. Te most recent report 
issued by the appeal panel from the Alberta–Beer Mark-Ups (Appeal Panel) 
dispute did help to clarify a number of points in respect of the CFTA’s national 
treatment obligation, as was discussed in Part III(C)(7), above. However, two key 
elements of a CFTA panel’s national treatment analysis remain unresolved: the 
requirements of a “like, directly competitive or substitutable” assessment at the 
frst stage of the analysis, and the meaning of “geographic neutrality” in assessing 
an indirect discrimination claim in the second stage of the analysis. Tis article 
123. Japan–Alcoholic Beverages (II) (Complaint by the European Communities) (1996), WTO
Doc WT/DS8/AB/R at 16 (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds8_e.htm> [perma.cc/STD3-8FFQ]. 
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will now proceed to explore both the implications and possible remedies to these 
two continued uncertainties. 
1. A CFTA “LIKE, DIRECTLY COMPETITIVE OR SUBSTITUTABLE” ANALYSIS 
To date, no claim of a national treatment obligation violation has failed on the 
“like, directly competitive or substitutable” stage of the analysis. However, the 
extent and quality of the assessments at this stage have been modest throughout 
CFTA jurisprudence. In some cases, AIT panels have simply asserted “likeness” 
without any analysis whatsoever, such as in the case of Ontario–Dairy (I).125 
In other cases, the panel may have reasoned why the imported and domestic 
products are like, but the panel did not cite authority for the means or framework 
by which it concluded likeness.126 Tat there is no consistent test applied in the 
CFTA “likeness” analysis not only deprives the litigating parties of fulsome 
reasoning, but it also makes it difcult for Canadian governments to create 
CFTA-compliant laws and regulations. 
Despite the parallels between the CFTA and GATT national treatment 
obligations, in no case has an AIT/CFTA presiding body cited the four factors 
routinely employed by WTO panels to ascertain likeness. Tese four factors, 
concisely re-expressed in EC–Asbestos, are: (1) Physical characteristics, (2) 
Consumer preferences, (3) End uses, and (4) Tarif classifcation.127 In GATT 
jurisprudence, these factors are requisite elements of a likeness examination.128 
No one factor is decisive.129 It is this approach that CFTA panels should adopt in 
the course of the frst stage of a national treatment analysis. 
In certain cases, the two products at issue were literally the same. For 
example, in New Brunswick–Dairy, the discrimination was in respect of Nova 
Scotia fuid milk products which were treated less favorably than New Brunswick 
fuid milk products. An implementation of the EC–Asbestos four-factor test could 
not have resulted in any fnding other than that the imported and domestic 
products were “like.” However, in Québec–Margarine, the two products were not 
the same: Domestic Quebec butter received more favourable treatment than the 
foreign Alberta margarine. Te four-factor analysis from EC–Asbestos suggests 
that the Québec–Margarine panel’s determination that butter and margarine were 
“like” was not necessarily obvious. Margarine and butter have diferent tarif 
125. See e.g. Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42 at 18. 
126. See e.g. Québec–Dairy, supra note 111 at 16. 
127. EC–Asbestos, supra note 99 at para 101. 
128. Ibid at para 109. 
129. Japan–Alcoholic Beverages (II), supra note 124 at 21. 




classifcations: their end-uses can difer, consumer preferences may not be the 
same, and physical characteristics are not necessarily similar either. A panel that 
considers and weighs each factor must think through its reasoning for a fnding 
of likeness, which may elevate the quality of the panel’s decision making. And 
a standard set of “likeness” factors would also bring consistency and coherence 
to the frst stage of the national treatment analysis. Te WTO’s four-factor 
test, which has been repeatedly used in GATT adjudication, could serve as that 
framework. Finally, a comprehensive framework would give greater guidance to 
Canadian governments hoping to craft measures that are consistent with their 
CFTA national treatment obligations. 
2. STAGE TWO “INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION” ANALYSIS 
A more complex uncertainty that remains unresolved in CFTA jurisprudence is 
the precise nature of the “indirect discrimination” analysis. Specifcally, CFTA 
case law has identifed that in order to remain in compliance with the national 
treatment obligation, the impact of a government’s measure on trade in goods 
must abide by a standard of “geographic neutrality.”130 Tough this is an important 
development, the contours of the “geographically neutral” requirement remain 
obscure in CFTA national treatment jurisprudence. 
Tere are many ways in which the phrase “geographic neutrality” can be 
interpreted, each of which can have a diferent impact on the conclusion of 
a national treatment analysis. Does “geographically neutral” mean that, for 
example, where a measure implemented by Province X requires that licences be 
held by producers of a particular good, the licences should be divided equally 
to every province and territory? But what if, just prior to the enactment of the 
measure, Province X had ten-times more producers of that good than Province 
Y? On a conceptual level, geographic neutrality makes sense in the context of 
national treatment obligations: A measure should not produce an efect that 
harms out-of-province producers more than domestic provincial producers, all 
things being equal. However, it can be a signifcant challenge to isolate and assess 
the trade fow efect of a legislative or regulatory measure on its own. A look 
towards the WTO’s approach to an indirect discrimination analysis may help 
guide future CFTA panels on the issue of “geographic neutrality.” 
Te WTO’s dispute settlement body has identifed two relevant means of 
testing for indirect discrimination. Te Appellate Body in EC–Seal Products 
frmly established the “disparate impact” test as one way to undertake an article 
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III national treatment analysis.131 In GATT jurisprudence, a measure inficts 
“disparate impact” on imported and domestic goods when it hurts the competitive 
opportunities of imported goods relative to those of domestic goods.132 Indeed, 
international trade scholars have suggested that the efects of a measure wield great 
importance in determining whether it will be deemed to accord protectionism.133 
In addition to an “efects” analysis, a WTO panel also looks to the “design, 
structure, and expected operation of the measure at issue.”134 Tough the efect 
of a measure can be important in determining whether it accords “less favorable 
treatment” to imported “like, directly competitive or substitutable” goods, the 
WTO’s Appellate Body has provided that a fnding of discrimination need not 
be based on the actual efects of the measure.135 
Tus, drawing on WTO jurisprudence, a CFTA panel has at least two means 
to identify a measure that facilitates indirect discrimination: an “efects” test, 
and a “design and structure” test. Indeed, in at least one instance, an AIT panel 
did not consider an impugned measure’s efects, and instead employed a version 
of this latter “design, structure and expected operation” test to identify indirect 
discrimination.136 Rather than examine the efects of the measure, the panel held 
that the challenged measure’s wording “makes it extremely difcult for the Act 
to be applied in a manner that is geographically neutral” and thus remain in 
compliance with the CFTA’s national treatment obligation.137 
Unfortunately, CFTA jurisprudence has thus far systemically implemented 
the “efects test” in a manner that generates concern for, and uncertainty about, 
the CFTA’s national treatment case law. Te CFTA dispute panel reports 
released have not adequately explained or justifed why the measures were not 
geographically neutral, which is a necessary intermediate conclusion to their 
131. See Julia Y Qin, “Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives Under WTO Law: Refections 
on EC—Seal Products” (2014-15) 108 AJIL Unbound 308. 
132. Joost Pauwelyn, “Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still Haunt 
the WTO” (2004) 15 Eur J Intl L 575 at 582. 
133. See generally Ming Du, supra note 50 at 155; Gâlea & Biriş, supra note 38 at 177. 
134. Tailand–Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (Complaint by 
the Philippines) (2011), WTO Doc WT/DS371/AB/R at para 134 (Appellate Body 
Report), online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds371_e.htm> 
[perma.cc/X2AQ-6J7B]. 
135. United States—Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations (Complaint by the European 
Communities) (2002), WTO Doc WT/DS108/AB/RW at para 215 (Appellate Body Report), 
online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm> [perma.cc/ 
NC7V-4KYW] [US–FSC]. 
136. New Brunswick–Dairy, supra note 86 at 13. 
137. Ibid. 
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ultimate fndings that the measure produced indirect discrimination. Te case of 
Ontario–Dairy (I) can help illustrate this common analytical shortcoming that 
appears throughout CFTA jurisprudence. 
Te panel in Ontario–Dairy (I) concluded that the Ontario measure had 
the efect of discriminating against vegetable-oil based dairy alternatives or dairy 
blends.138 However, without ever establishing why discrimination against dairy 
alternatives and blends was not “geographically neutral,” the panel concluded 
that the measure indirectly discriminated against foreign goods and thereby 
violated the national treatment obligation.139 Because the Ontario measure was 
neutral on its face, for the panel’s conclusion to logically follow, the reader of 
the report is forced to assume that there are very few, if any, producers of dairy 
blends or dairy alternatives in Ontario. Tus, by discriminating against such 
products, Ontario was primarily discriminating against “like” foreign products 
(i.e., dairy blends and dairy alternatives). However, the panel report does not 
provide for this necessary logical link in the body of the report. If 99 per cent 
of all Canadian producers of dairy alternatives or dairy blends were based out of 
Ontario, would an Ontario policy discriminating against dairy alternatives or 
dairy blends have violated the CFTA’s national treatment clause? Te failure of 
the panel in Ontario–Dairy (I) to establish the lacking “geographic neutrality” 
of an indirectly discriminatory measure—an essential conclusion for a fnding of 
national treatment violation—is a consistent feature of CFTA national treatment 
jurisprudence. A measure may validly discriminate against a “like” product and 
remain consistent with the CFTA’s national treatment obligation. It is only those 
discriminatory measures that fail to remain “geographically neutral” that cause a 
violation of the agreement. 
Tere need not be a numerical threshold to surpass for a panel to reach 
a conclusion as to whether the policy is geographically neutral. Moreover, the 
WTO has not created a numerical “test” for a measure to satisfy that would allow 
it to deem that the disparate impact has reached discriminatory levels. However, 
the WTO’s Appellate Body requires a panel to undertake “careful analysis of 
the contested measure and of its implications in the marketplace” to justifably 
establish a fnding that a party violated its national treatment obligation.140 
Carefully constructed reasoning that shows how the CFTA panel arrived at 
its conclusion that the measure not only discriminated against a particular 
product, but that the discriminated product was chiefy an import relative to its 
138. Ontario–Dairy (I), supra note 42 at 18. 
139. Ibid at 17-18. 






MANUCHA, INTERNALIzING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 459 
better-treated domestic counterpart, is a necessary part of a conclusion of indirect 
discrimination. 
Tis article does not advance the argument that CFTA panels should 
create a bright line test to determine whether or not a measure satisfes a test of 
geographical neutrality. Instead, this article argues that a panel should be required 
to make explicit its reasoning so that the justifcation is clear and transparent, 
so that over time the CFTA national treatment jurisprudence may ofer a fair and 
consistent approach and provide future disputants greater predictability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Largely untouched for over twenty-fve years, the collective jurisprudence of 
the CFTA is ripe for analysis and constructive criticism by the legal academic 
community. Tis is especially true with the CFTA’s dispute forum taking on 
heightened importance as a result of the Court’s 2018 ruling in R v Comeau, 
wherein the Court efectively ruled that it would not strike down non-tarif 
measures notwithstanding their detrimental efects on internal trade. Tis article 
aims to spark a scholarly dialogue on the contents of domestic trade dispute 
rulings, and to that end, focuses on the jurisprudence of one obligation under the 
agreement in particular: Te national treatment requirement. 
Te contours of the national treatment obligation under the CFTA have 
gained greater coherence over the AIT’s lifetime. Te most recent case, Alberta– 
Beer Markups, provided much needed clarity and analytical rigour to the national 
treatment analysis. Tough Alberta–Beer Markups improved the state of national 
treatment jurisprudence, it left unresolved the means to answer two key questions. 
First, when are two products “like, directly competitive and substitutable” in the 
context of the CFTA? Second, when is an indirectly discriminatory measure 
“geographically neutral”? To fll these analytical gaps, this article advanced 
proposals that drew from GATT jurisprudence. 
Opaque internal trade obligations make it difcult for policy makers to craft 
measures that comply with the strictures of the CFTA. In addition, domestic 
commercial actors who encounter trade barriers may aver from engaging with 
the CFTA’s dispute resolution process if the jurisprudential uncertainty weighs 
against the cost of litigation. Neither of these outcomes helps bring to bear the 
economic unity that the nation’s internal trade agreement regime was meant to 
improve in the frst place. 
